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1.   Background 
 
Currently the UK water industry consists of regional incumbent water and sewerage 
companies and water only utility companies who are licensed to perform specific 
duties.  The structure of these licence holders is little different from that of the 
industry when privatised in 1989 although the ownership has changed significantly 
since that time.  They are regulated by a sector specific regulator, the Office of Water 
Services (Ofwat) and the main regulatory process is a price control regime that has 
five year price caps based loosely on a yardstick competition model.  Water quality 
and service standards are set and policed by Ofwat and an environmental regulator, 
the Environment Agency.   
 
As with most water companies in the world these companies face very little 
competition for the delivery of water within their area.  Recently, both the government 
and Ofwat have indicated that they wish to see a major change in the industry through 
a significant growth of competition.  In particular they wish  to see independent 
suppliers and water companies outside the incumbent’s footprint supplying water to 
customers within the incumbent’s market.  For this to happen there will need to be 
common carriage of water by the incumbent operators.  Given the nature of the water 
transmission system the water pumped into a grid by an independent supplier will not 
in general be the water that is consumed by the relevant customer.  This will cause 
problems of monitoring standards and even defining what the common carriage 
actually is.  However, at the end of the day, whether competition develops or not will 
depend mostly on the cost structure of the industry and the access prices that are 
charged by the incumbents.  
 
There are many who are sceptical as to whether the water industry has the underlying 
economics to justify and sustain enough competition of this type to have anything 
other than peripheral impact in the industry.  Hand in hand with this view goes a fear 
that competition may be ‘falsely’ promoted.  On the other if true competition can be 
sustained this will have major implications for the water industry throughout the 
world. Therefore, the framework that governs the access-pricing regime is critical. 
The water regulator has already stated that it intends to deal with common carriage 
using competition law rather than sector specific regulation through company licences   2
and that when it comes to pricing of common carriage ‘it supports the underlying 
objective of the Economic Component Pricing Rule’.
1  In contrast to water, 
telecommunications has seen enormous development of competition in the last twenty 
years and has a long history of regulation of access pricing both through competition 
law and sector specific regulation.  The aim of this paper is to assess competition 
policy in telecommunications and its implications for the regulation of the pricing of 
common carriage in the water industry.   
 
Section 2 of the paper compares competition law and sector specific regulation as it 
has developed in the UK and shows that there is a tension between these two models.  
Their objectives are different and this is very clear when one compares the history of 
the two regulatory frameworks in the UK.  Therefore, it is likely to be important 
which framework is used to regulate prices.  Section 3 of the paper outlines UK and 
EC competition law in telecommunications.  This section discusses excessive pricing 
but focuses on the recent emphasis in competition law on price squeeze as a form of 
abuse.  It is shown how price squeeze as a test can conflict with efficiency but shows 
that this conflict is very dependent on the interpretation of acceptable undue 
discrimination.  Currently, these issues remain untested in competition law.   
 
Section 4 looks at sector specific regulation in the  UK telecommunications market 
and provides a close discussion of the LRIC model.  It is shown that this model is not 
incremental cost in the traditional sense but operates instead as a price squeeze test on 
upstream prices.  It is argued that this difference in the increment concept arose 
because the LRIC model was introduced to deal with a special situation, namely to 
ensure that the incumbent is not discriminating in favour of its own downstream 
operation and to promote competition rather than simply protecting it.  This situation 
is contrasted with the service provider regime in the industry.   
 
Finally, Section 5 addresses the implications for the pricing of common carriage.  It is 
argued that the water sector has little to gain from the LRIC model as used in the UK 
telecommunications sector.  We suggest that it is the recent focus by the European 
Commission and the UK authorities on price squeeze as a form of abuse that is the 
                                                   
1 Ofwat (2001).    3
most important carryover from telecommunications competition law since the 
guidelines and law on excessive pricing are unlikely to be very helpful.  When 
applying a price squeeze test it is the interpretation of discrimination will be critical.  
Deciding whether to apply a price squeeze test and, if so the definition of acceptable 
discrimination, is likely to be the most important component in providing a neutral 
common carriage pricing framework that will provide the basis for a true ‘test’ of the 
feasibility of competition in water.  The telecommunications regulator, Oftel, has 
adopted a tight interpretation of undue discrimination whereas Ofwat appear to be 
adopting a looser one.  However, these agencies are both supposed to be 
implementing the same Competition Act.  The article closes with a few comments on 
the implication of this  for the current UK policy of concurrent application of the 
Competition Act by the Office of Fair Trading and the sector specific regulators.   
 
 
2.  The competition law and regulatory background 
 
This section provides a brief summary of competition law and sector specific 
regulation in the UK.  A central concern is that there is a tension between these two 
regulatory models in terms of what they seek to achieve and as a result how they are 
implemented.  This is clearly evident from the UK experience.   
 
2.1 Competition law 
 
Since April 2000 UK and EC competition law is basically similar.
2  The main thrust 
behind the 1998 Competition Act is to create an Article 81/82 of the EC Treaty look-
alike within the UK.  Indeed, somewhat unusually, this congruence goes well beyond 
the decision to adopt identical wording.  The 1998 Act includes a section, Section 60, 
which specifies that the 1998 Act is to be interpreted in the light of relevant European 
case law.  In particular, the UK court must act with a view to securing that there is no 
inconsistency with any relevant decision of the European Court and have regard to  
                                                   
2 For a detailed statement of the Competition Act see Freeman and Whish (1999); for a brief 
introduction see Grout (1999).    4
any relevant decision or statement by the Commission.  Access pricing is covered 
both by competition law on agreements and abuse of a dominant position.  However, 
it is likely to be the latter that is most relevant for regulation of common carriage of 
water.   
 
The abuse of dominance is covered in Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Chapter II of 
the 1998 Competition Act.  The wording of Chapter II and Artic le 82 is sparse; no 
more than half a page.  It essentially prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by one 
or more undertakings and provides examples of conduct that may be considered an 
abuse.  Of particular relevance for access pricing is ‘imposing unfair purchase or 
selling prices’ and ‘ applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions … 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage’.  An undertaking is dominant if it 
can make decisions ‘to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and 
customers and ultimately of consumers’.
3  The standard mechanism for implementing 
Chapter II or Article 82 has three-stages.  First the market is defined, then it is 
determined whether the firm is dominant on that market and finally, if so, there is an 
assessment whether the company is abusing its dominance.  It is only the last stage, 
i.e., the abuse of a dominant position, which is prohibited, i.e., in theory being 
dominant is not in itself a problem. 
 
Competition law is essentially about preventing abusive behaviour rather than 
controlling prices directly.  As the current DGFT recently outlined ‘making markets 
work well for consumers is what the OFT is all about’ and ‘markets work well for 
consumers when fair-dealing businesses are in vigorous c ompetition for custom’. 
Essentially, the drive is to improve competition, productivity and choice; lower prices 
should follow and lower profitability is likely to follow but this is not the direct target. 
The distinction between dominance and abuse reflects this.  That is, the Office of Fair 
Trading’s definition of market power is ‘…the ability to raise prices consistently and 
profitably above competitive levels’ but the guidelines explicitly state that normally 
evidence of  supra-normal profit is not sufficient evidence on its own to justify a 
finding of abuse.  In particular, ‘it is unlikely, however, that the Director General 
                                                   
3 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429   5
would conclude that an undertaking was abusing a dominant position solely on the 
evidence of supra-normal profit.’
4 
 
The drive to productivity has been a central issue at the heart of the current 
government’s approach of competition policy.  Margaret Beckett (when President of 
the Board) stated that ‘Effective and fair competition is essential to ensure value for 
customers.’  This is also reflected in European competition policy.  For example, the 
European Commission’s 28
th Report on Competition Policy (1998) pointed out that 
‘competition policy has an important role to play in safeguarding or enhancing 
flexibility of product and service markets’.  Thus at the centre of competition policy is 
the focus on preventing unacceptable behaviour through ex post punishment rather 
than a focus on controlling prices to ensure returns fall within a specific band.  
 
2.2 Sector specific regulation 
 
In contrast to general competition law, most sector specific regulation of utilities in 
the UK has been devised for a specific purpose, primarily to prevent privatised 
utilities from taking advantage of their post-privatisation position.  There are two 
obvious ways that regulation can seek to achieve this goal.  One is to actively promote 
competition, leaving the competitive process to bring pressure on prices and costs.  
The other is to achieve the same effect on prices and costs by regulating prices.  That 
is, curb the problem directly where there is an absence of effective competition.   
 
The regulatory structure has adopted both routes. In the case of telecommunications 
the 1984 Act specifies regulatory duties which include promoting the interests of 
consumers, purchasers and other users in respect of prices, quality and variety of 
telecommunications services and to promote effective competition.  In the water 
industry regulatory duties include ensuring that the interests of customers or potential 
customers are protected in respect to companies charges and to facilitate effective 
competition, with respect to such matters as he considers appropriate, between 
persons holding or seeking appointments.  Here the powers relate directly to prices 
                                                   
4  2.15 of Office of Fair Trading (2000).  This section of the guidelines emphasises the problems with 
using the cost of capital in this context.  For a discussion of the cost of capital in a regulatory context 
see Grout (1995, 1998).   6
and the promotion of competition as opposed to the protection of competition. The 
powers of the sector specific regulator over the companies in the sector stem to a large 
extent through the requirement that companies by licensed by the regulator before 
they can operate.   
 
Given these duties the regulatory model that has developed has, not surprisingly, been 
strong on ex ante regulation of behaviour and prices, particularly the latter.
5  All 
sector specific regulators impose price caps on companies and the process of 
removing these has been slow.  For example, the view of the previous 
telecommunications regulator that the price cap implemented in 1997 would be the 
last has not come to pass.  The price controls are designed so that a company’s 
expected return is equal to the cost of capital.  In general sector specific regulators 
have tended to perceive returns above the cost of capital as a sign of error in the 
regulatory system or abnormal unexpected efficiency gain by the company and as a 
mark that the regulatory controls should be tightened.  The framework is one where 
returns are expected to be close to the cost of capital and deviations from this are 
typically taken as clear indications of excessive prices.  For example, comments in a 
recent mobile review by Oftel (Oftel (2001)) capture the approach: ‘in a competitive 
market, Oftel would expect prices, and consequently profits, to reflect efficiently 
incurred costs plus an adequate return on capital’.   
 
2.3 The tension between competition law and sector specific regulation 
 
The sector specific focus on ‘tight’ price bands and promotion of competition is in 
marked contrast to the competition law approach.  While it is too soon to know how 
the 1998 Competition Act will manifest itself in the prevention of excessive pricing 
some guide can be gauged by looking at cases under the 1973 Fair Trading Act.  
Looking at these cases that have appeared before the MMC we find a very different 
position.  Average rate of return on capital employed has been 44%, with an average 
of 45% for cases where there was an adverse finding and 41% for those where there 
was no adverse finding.  Looking at cases where the primary concern was potential  
                                                   
5  We are side stepping the issue of whether regulators can actually precommit themselves to decisions 
and the effect on investment (e.g., Grout (1984), Hart and Holmstrom (1987)).   7
monopoly pricing the figures are 61%, 67% and 48% respectively.  For cases where 
the primary concern was abuse of vertical integration the figures are 52%, 54% and 
51%.  Furthermore, across all cases there is no statistical relationship between 
profitability and the Commission’s finding.   
 
That is, there appears to be a large wedge between the ex ante sector specific 
regulation approach and the ex post competition law approach.  A similar wedge 
appears in the US framework.  The US Department of Justice’s Merger guidelines, 
although somewhat mechanistic, do not adopt a narrow approach of assessing returns 
above the cost of capital.  The Guidelines use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI).  
This ranges from 0 (perfectly competitive industry) to 10,000 (a pure monopoly).  The 
guidelines indicate that a merger will ordinarily be approved in an industry with an 
initial HHI measure of 1000 or less.  Only with a HHI over 1,800 and a merger that 
raises the index by more than a 100 more do they feel the merger is likely to create or 
enhance market power.  A HHI measure below 1000 is perfectly compatible with 




Overall, there is a tension between ex post competition law and the ex ante regulation 
model in term of what they are seeking to achieve.  This is not merely one of wording 
but clearly manifests itself in the behaviour of the relevant regulatory agencies.  
Furthermore, in Europe an additional objective, the single market agenda, is also at 
the heart of competition policy.  This adds to the distance between the competition 
law approach and the sector specific regulation model.   
 
This distance implies that the implications for access pricing levels may be very 
different depending on whether the access-pricing problem is seen to be a pure 
competition law issue or whether it should be brought into the sector specific 
regulatory framework.
7  This decision over which approach to use is non-trivial and it 
is not obvious what the ground rules are.  Evidence from the other utility sectors is not 
helpful for the current water context since the other utility regulators did not have the 
                                                   
6 Note EC merger policy has similar characteristics and is often criticised for failing to prevent price 
rises or doing so through strange routes such as in the Airtours case (see Motta (2000)).  
7 In the case of water this will require a licence amendment.     8
1998 Competition Act as an alternative to the sector specific model when they opted 




Before moving onto competition law and regulation in telecommunications it is useful 
to provide a brief summary of efficient access pricing rules.  The core problem arises 
from fixed and common costs.  Each customer pays the incumbent for the marginal 
cost of consumption plus a contribution to the fixed and common costs of the system 
that is used to deliver the product. If an entrant takes demand away from the 
incumbent then the entrant’s price for access to the system should reflect a 
contribution to the fixed and common costs of the system.  The problem is to 
determine how much this should be.   
 
In a simple static model the final prices charged to customers should reflect general 
Ramsey prices, i.e., the prices should be highest where demand is most inelastic.
8  
Such prices will dictate the contribution that the new entrant’s customers should make 
to the network and as such will determine the access price.  In almost all cases this 
will imply an access price that is greater than marginal cost.  Thus marginal cost will 
not be the appropriate access pricing r ule even where long run marginal cost is the 
appropriate variable.
9  In certain simple cases the access pricing rule is simply the 
incremental cost plus the full contribution to the network that the customer had been 
making.  This is the Economic Component Pricing or Baulmol-Willig rule (ECPR).  If 
the incumbent is regulated, or profit is constrained through competitive forces, then 
this rule takes the form of an access price that is equal to the incumbent’s retail price 
minus the costs that the incumbent forgoes when it loses a customer.   
 
Baumol (1995, 2001) provides a justification for this rule.  Armstrong (1998), Laffont 
and Tirole (1996) and Laffont, Tirole and Rey (1998) provide excellent discussion of 
optimal access pricing and the relation to ECPR.  This paper contains a brief technical 
                                                   
8 Formally, the elasticities should be superelasticities.   
9 We are side-stepping some timing issues here.  The differences between long run and short run 
marginal costs are discussed in Hern (2001).   9
appendix that shows the formal relationship between access pricing rules determined 
by Ramsey prices and the ECPR in a simple model.  
 
 
3.   Competition Law in Telecommunications 
 
For the problem at hand many of the germane aspects of UK and EU competition law 
are not based in case law.  Rather they sit within the guidelines of the 1998 
Competition Act and notices provided by the European Commission as to how they 
will interpret competition law in the context of access to essential facilities.  As 
indicated in the previous section, under Section 60 the UK courts are not bound by the 
views of the Commission in this context but must have regard to any relevant 
statement by the Commission.  In addition, the guidelines of the 1998 Competition 
Act remain relatively untested so a great deal is ‘up for grabs’ at present.  An 
excellent discussion of the implications of essential facilities law is available in 
Aitman (2001) and will not be pursued here.  This section briefly assesses the OFT 
guidelines on excessive pricing before focussing on the price squeeze which seems 
most pertinent of the potential crossovers from telecommunications.  We argue that in 
the context of utilities both excessive pricing and the price squeeze are  in need of 
more clarification as forms of abuse.  
 
3.1 Excessive pricing. 
 
The European court of Justice views ‘charging a price which is excessive because it 
has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied is an 
abuse’.
10  This is a somewhat vague notion.  In practice, the earning of supra-normal 
profit has been interpreted as an indication of potential excessive pricing.  Of course, 
the earning of supra-normal profit is not in itself a sign of excessive pricing since it 
may arise from many sources.  The OFT are clear on this but point out that ‘excessive 
pricing will be regarded as an abuse only where it is clear that high profits will not 
stimulate successful new entry within a reasonable period’.
11  This view appears to be  
                                                   
10 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429. 
11 2.13 Office of Fair Trading (2000).   10
drifting away from the traditional protection of competition approach towards 
promotion of competition inherent in the utility sector acts.  It is stated even more 
strongly in the Oftel guidelines: ‘essential prices will be abusive if they have persisted 
… without stimulating new entry or significant loss of market share’.
12  However, if 
the natural economic state of a market is a single supplier then it is not clear how this 
test will help determine excessive pricing in a sensible manner. 
 
A feature common to all utility sectors is the prevalence of fixed and common costs.  
This causes no problems for the definition of profitability for the enterprise as a whole 
but can cause problems for the definition of parts of the business.  Since common 
costs are covered by the prices of several activities, the definition of profitability for 
any individual activity is not well defined.  It is possible to impose certain restrictions 
on prices that arise from a simplistic theoretical model of a static competitive 
equilibrium.  In particular, the price of any activity would not be above the standalone 
cost of producing that activity since competitors could then enter and underprice the 
existing firm.  Therefore, in a simple equilibrium, a potential test for excessive pricing 
of a particular activity is that the price is in excess of standalone cost.  If competition 
ensures that there is no overall excess return then a consequence of this relationship is 
that there should be no activity with a price below incremental cost.  This l atter 
corollary of the excessive pricing ‘requirement’ is the predation test in the presence of 
common costs.
13    
 
The guidelines to the Competition Act recognise the standalone ‘test’: ‘revenues of an 
undertaking significantly and consistently exceeding its standalone cost in a particular 
activity may indicate that excessive prices have been charged’.
14  However, the 
guidelines step back from using thus as a test of supra-normal profit by stating that 
‘the standalone cost assumes that the hypothetical efficient competitor will not be able 
to cover the common costs from another activity’.
15  This strong hint that only part of 
                                                   
12 7.35 of Oftel (2000).  
13 This interpretation is consistent with the EC’s more recent views on predatory pricing (see Grout 
(2001) for a detailed discussion of predation in EC and UK competition policy).  
14 2.16 of Office of Fair Trading (2000). 
15 2.17 of Office of Fair Trading (2000).   11
the common cost ought to be taken into account leaves the treatment of excessive 
prices in the presence of fixed and common costs rather vague.
16   
 
3.2 Price squeeze  
 
Th most important potential crossover from telecommunications competition law for 
common carriage of water is the recent focus on the concept of a price squeeze in 
both EC and UK policy. Essentially, a price squeeze test ties retail and upstream 
prices together to prevent competitors being squeeze out of the market.
17  While not a 
method of establishing the correct cost of common carriage it does in theory set a 
precise ceiling on the cost of common carriage once retail prices are given.  However, 
although the price squeeze is now well documented in the UK guidelines and EC 
notices and decisions it is almost non existent in case law.  For this reason it is useful 
to provide some background.  
 
The initial application of the notion of a price squeeze in antitrust law arose in the 
United States v Alcoa case in the 1930s and 1940s.   Judge Hand found against Alcoa 
in the Court of Appeals in 1945 suggesting that, amongst other things, they were 
guilty of raising the price of competitors essential inputs - ingot  - so that they could 
not compete with Alcoa in sheet rolling, i.e., the downstream market.  The price 
squeeze in European Community competition policy has very limited history.  It arose 
briefly in National Carbonising Company  and Napier Brown/British Sugar but 
recently has received considerable emphasis in a series of speeches and articles.
18  For 
example, John Temple Lang has stated: ‘It is contrary to Article 86 if a dominant 
company sells both a raw material and an end product at prices that are so close to one 
another that a reasonably efficient competitor buying the raw material cannot make a 
profit and would be forced out of business.   This can be regarded as a price squeeze 
or as raising competitors costs or providing an  essential facility at an un-economic 
price.  A defence that the dominant company downstream operations are 
                                                   
16 There is also a conceptual problem if the company is non-dominant in some markets but is deemed 
dominant in others.  If a common cost covers some products that are dominant and others that are not 
then it becomes difficult to apply Chapter II to the dominant markets alone. 
17 A price squeeze test is sometimes referred to as an imputation rule. 
18 See Commission Decision 76/185/ECSC of 29 October 1975, National Carbonising Company and 
Commission Decision 88/518/EEC of 18 July 1988, Napier Brown/British    12
exceptionally competitive is admissible, but exceptionally clear cost accounts would 
be essential to prove it.’
19 Similar ideas can be found elsewhere.
20    
 
Most significantly, the recent notice on application of competition rules to access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector the Commission has taken a significant 
step beyond the existing US and EC position by raising the price squeeze as an 
explicit abuse and formulating precisely what may constitute a price squeeze.
21  In the 
Notice the Commission provides two ways that a price squeeze could be 
demonstrated.  These are: 
 
 ‘a price squeeze could be demonstrated by showing that the dominant 
company’s own downstream operations could not trade profitably on the basis 
of the upstream price charged to its competitors by the operating arm of the 
dominant company’  
and  
 ‘the margin between price charged to competitors on the downstream market 
for access and the price which the network operator charges in the downstream 
market is sufficient to allow a reasonably efficient service provider to obtain a 
normal profit’. 
 
We can think of these as similar approaches appear in the Oftel sector specific 
guidelines. 
 
The Commission has gone further, however, than simply issuing notices on their 
interpretation of price squeeze in telecommunications.  For example, it has used the 
possibility of a price squeeze, along with other potential abuses, to intervene against 
Deutsche Telekom. ‘In a provisional assessment of the proposed tariff scheme the 
Commission concluded that the new tariffs were incompatible with the competition 
rules of the Treaty.  It was clear in particular that they would discriminate in favour of 
business customers vis a vis residential customers, that they would have price 
squeezing effects on competitors and that they represented bundling i.e. the undue 
linking of the provision of the monopoly and competitive services.   The Commission 
required a number of conditions to be fulfilled including the granting of infrastructure 
                                                   
19 John Temple Lang (1996).  Note Article 86 refers to Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome (identical to 
Article 82 of the revised and consolidated EC Treaty). 
20 See for example, Schaub (1996) and Ungerer (1996).. 
21 European Commission (1998).    13
licences before the tariff scheme came into operation and the prevention of the tariff 
scheme being applied retroactively.   This is an excellent example of how the 




A price squeeze is often presented as a special case of raising rivals costs.  Raising 
rivals costs is a general concept referring to any situation where the vertically 
integrated f irm acts to raise upstream prices with the purpose, implicitly if not 
explicitly, to eliminate or chill downstream competition.   Actions to limit competitors 
access to the independent supply of upstream inputs, hence raising the competitor’s 
cost and reducing downstream competition, fall into this category.   Indeed, a 
significant proportion of the Alcoa case concerns Alcoa's attempts to restrict the 
supply of competitors' essential inputs, notably electricity and bauxite, in the upstream 
market by entering long contracts and commitments over that supply.  For example, 
the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the US 
Department of Justice states: ‘The 1984 Guidelines recognise that integrated firms 
may also engage in price or supply '"squeezes" against their non-integrated rivals 
(1984 Merger Guidelines S4.211, n.31).   This is of course a form of raising rivals 
costs.’
23   
 
There is a subtle difference, however, between a price squeeze and raising rivals 
costs.  The former is a statement that compares the difference between two prices, 
input and output prices, and costs. It tells one something about the ease with which 
potential competitors may be able to enter a downstream market but in its literal form 
it is no more than a static technical comparison of levels.  In contrast, raising rivals 
costs carries with it an indication of intent that almost inevitably achieves a chilling of 
downstream competition even if this is not the prime motivation.  This may appear to 
be a trivial distinction but could be important.  Defining a price squeeze as 
automatically abusive raises a potential conflict with economically efficient pricing 
structures.  
 
                                                   
22  Pons (1998).   
23 Sunshine (1995), Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice.   14
Consider the following simple example.  A company is the sole supplier of water 
transportation in an area and sells ten units of water at the retail level and one unit to a 
competitor who sells it on to a customer located close to the water source (i.e., there is 
no need for transportation).  The cost technology of producing water consists of a 
fixed c ost of 11 and a marginal cost of one per unit.  The cost technology of 
transporting water has a fixed cost of 10 and marginal cost of unity.  Finally, there is a 
downstream (say retail) cost of one per unit.  If the company’s pricing policy just 
covers cost then the final price per unit at the retail level is 5 and the consumer at 
source pays 2.  Suppose now that a competitor wishes to transport water over the 
system to compete for a retail customer consuming one unit.  The ECPR price for 
transportation is  3.  This is derived by deducting from the retail price the full 
reduction in cost that the company with the essential facility faces.  That is, the 
company will save one unit of marginal cost at the retail level and one unit at the 
water supply level so the ECPR price is 5–1-1.   
 
This price, however, will fail the price squeeze test. Using the EC terminology the 
dominant company’s own downstream operations could not trade profitably on the 
basis of the upstream price charged to its competitors by the operating arm of the 
dominant company.  The dominant company is selling water at a cost per unit for 
water of 2 and a downstream cost of 1 and as such will only be able to operate 
profitably if it paid a price of 2 for transportation.  That is, the price squeeze indicates 
that the transportation price is capped at 2.   
 
Note that the conflict depends on part on the cost structure.  If the fixed cost is 
variable in the long run then taking a very long run view of costs will remove the 
problem since the 10 units will then become variable in the very long run.  However, 
if the company has a set up cost of 10 units regardless of output, i.e., the costs are 
fixed for technical reasons, then the problem does not go away.  Furthermore, the 
same problem arises if instead of fixed costs of 10 and 11 there is a common cost of 
21 across the two upstream components.  In this case the time frame would be 
irrelevant.   
 
The contradiction between ECPR and the price squeeze arises because a price 
squeeze test is purely concerned  with protecting the potential entrant and not   15
concerned with whether it is efficient to do so.  It is not concerned with the 
contribution to the existing network nor whether the price squeeze causes stranded 
assets.  Interestingly, the history of price squeeze cases in the US electricity market 
has not been one of success in proving violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  
This may in part be because of the conflict with efficient pricing although Joskow 
(1985) suggests that this is in part due to the need to establish intent to monopolise 
these markets. 
 
In the example explored above, as with many price squeeze cases, this conflict 
between efficiency and a price squeeze test can be resolved by having sufficient 
discrimination in the markets.  For example, in the case above, if one is allowed to 
distinguish between the unit of water sold to the competitor, charged at 2, and water 
sold to a competitor who wishes to compete downstream, sold at 1, then the problem 
goes away.  This is because the competitor buys water upstream at 1 and common 
carriage at 3 giving at total upstream cost of 4.  Such a competitor can compete in the 
downstream market providing their downstream cost is no higher than the 
incumbent’s.  It is a general feature of price squeeze tests that the conflict between the 
test and the efficient outcomes is greater the tighter the definition of discrimination.  
In this context a competition law has a tighter definition of discrimination if it rules 
out more pricing differences as unduly discriminatory.  This conflict is an example of 
the standard conflict that arises in economics between efficiency and prices that are 
not allowed to reflect differences in demand (see Grout (1996)).  
 
There is an unusual feature of this pricing framework that is worth mentioning in 
passing.  This is we resolve the inefficiency by ensuring that water sold to firms who 
wish to compete with the incumbent downstream should be sold at a price that is 
charged to a company that does not compete with the incumbent.  This is opposed to 
the one of the traditional implications of ECPR: that inputs are sold at higher prices 
the more the purchaser’s sales displace incumbent sales.  This apparent contradiction 
with the standard implication arises because the downstream competitor is paying the 
full ECPR price for common carriage.   
 
The example given above is a special case of a large class of problems that arise for 
price squeeze tests in anything other than single product markets with simple   16
upstream and downstream cost technologies.  That is, despite the apparent clarity of 
the Commission’s definition, problems begin to emerge as soon as one thinks of 
practical application in access markets.  Here we provide an example where the 
simple application of the price squeeze causes a conflict with efficiency objectives 
because there are many products.   
 
In a world with several inputs and retail products the price squeeze test will dictate 
where common costs have to be recouped.   For example, suppose a particular retail 
product only uses two upstream inputs of a vertically integrated company but the 
market for the product will only sustain a price marginally above incremental cost.   
The price squeeze test will indicate that the prices in the upstream market for these 
two inputs must be set virtually at their incremental cost.  That is, sales of these inputs 
to third parties wishing to compete in this downstream market cannot recover any of 
the upstream common costs, i.e., costs that are common between inputs.   If the 
vertically integrated company is to cover its full upstream costs then the upstream 
common costs will need to be covered in prices of other inputs.  The application of a 
price squeeze test on products using these other higher priced inputs implies that the 
retail prices for these products must cover all the upstream common costs.    
 
It is easy to see the difficulties that can emerge by considering a simple situation 
where the vertically integrated company, has two other retail products in addition to 
the one that barely covers incremental costs of its inputs.  If these two retail products 
use in the same proportion the inputs that are carrying the common cost then changing 
the method of recovery of common cost between these inputs does not help to provide 
any flexibility between the retail prices.  That is, if one input is made more expensive 
and the other cheaper this will not change the relative price of the two services that 
are covering the common costs. To move the price of one of these retail products 
relative to the other the price of inputs going into the barely profitable retail product 
need to be raised but the price squeeze test prevents any allocation of common costs 
to these inputs.   That is, application of the price squeeze test to the markets has tied 
the prices of retail products together. 
 
The vertically integrated company is then faced with a choice between either 
accepting limitations on its pricing flexibility or no longer offering the less profitable   17
product.  If the costs associated with losing pricing flexibility are large then the 
company may decide to stop providing the marginally profitable retail product.   It is 
important to note that the reason that the company may no longer wish to offer it is 
not because the price squeeze limits how high the company can raise prices for the 
other retail products but merely that the cost to the vertically integrated company of 
the loss of flexibility is too great to justify continuing to supply the marginal retail 
product.   The effect is that it may prove impossible to sustain certain products in the 
market even though the products are capable of covering their average incremental 
cost.  Clearly, this problem is more severe the more sophisticated the market.    
 
In the above example, it has been implicitly assumed that, because the vertically 
integrated firm is forced to sell particular inputs to a retail product at prices close to 
their incremental cost, this price should carry over to price squeeze tests for other 
retail products.   If this is not the case then the problem goes away.   So the issue is 
one of the appropriate interpretation of discrimination in a price squeeze context.   An 
alternative interpretation of discrimination in this context is one that ties the price of a 
retail product to the price of inputs used to compete in that market.   That is, a price 
squeeze can be invoked as an abuse if a vertically integrated company refused to 
supply inputs to a competitor in market A at prices that allowed the competitor to 
make a reasonable margin in market A.   A similar test could exist for market B but 
without the additional restriction that the prices for inputs into different market must 
always be the same.   The decision as to how the joint application of several price 
squeeze tests will work should be dictated by the specifics of the case.   A blanket rule 
that assumes that all input prices are tied together across price squeeze tests will be 
extremely restrictive.  
 
The general point is that the price squeeze, although naturally appealing, can have an 
inappropriate effect on efficiency.  This is part of a greater conflict between 
competition law and efficiency objectives that is frequently levied at EC competition 
law, most notably in the context of mergers.  The two examples show that the conflict 
can be severe, if the price squeeze is narrowly defined.  At present these issues remain 
unresolved in the telecommunications sector.  How big a problem this may be for any 
particular sector and issue depends on the cost structure of the industry.  Exactly what   18
implications can be drawn from this for common carriage of water are discussed in 
section 5.  
 
 
4.  Sector specific regulation 
 
The process of sector specific regulation in telecommunications operates under 
specific regulatory duties which include promoting t he interests of consumers in 
respect of prices, quality and variety of telecommunications services and promoting 
effective competition.  The discussion in this section draws the distinction between 
access to the local loop and access to the network.  Those that access the network are 
further separated into licensed operators and service providers since they face a very 
different regulatory framework.
24   
 
4.1 Access to the local loop  
At the time of privatisation of BT it was generally agreed that there was an imbalance 
of prices between calls and rentals.  In particular, BT argued that it failed to recover 
the cost of provision and running of local lines through its connection and rental 
charges.  This deficit was referred as the Access Deficit. In order to prevent BT from 
re-balancing prices too rapidly in its attempt to offset these losses, restrictions were 
added to the basket of BT’s telecommunications services.  In particular, over and 
above the restriction of RPI - 3% on the basket of services during the period 1984 to 
1989, BT was also prevented from raising the price of residential exchange line 
rentals by more than RPI + 2% per year.  This restriction continued to be in force for 
the second and third price controls.   
 
In 1991 the rebalancing issue became a central concern as the government proposed to 
open up the UK telecommunications market (the so-called Duopoly Review).  Prior to 
this Mercury Communications was the only national company licensed to compete 
with BT.  As part of the Duopoly Review, Oftel formally recognised the access deficit 
and introduced an Access Deficit Charge (ADC).  Essentially payments by licensed  
                                                   
24 See Cave (1997) and Valletti (1999) for a good discussion of the development of telecommunications 
regulation in the UK.   19
operators to covey a call over BT’s local loop would include a component designed to 
compensate BT for the contribution the call would have made to the access deficit had 
the customer remained with BT.  The ADC was in essence an ECPR applied to the 
local loop.  It was not exactly a pure ECPR because the access deficit was based on 
accounting cost.  That is, the access deficit only included the section of common costs 
that were allocated to the local loop.  In other respects it was a straightforward 
application of the opportunity cost principle underlying the ECPR.  
 
In practice, however, the Access Deficit Contributions were almost all waived by 
DGT.  The DGT justified the waiver as part of the regulatory objective to promote 
competition.  Specifically, the licence amendments allowed the DGT to reduce the 
ADC ’where and to the extent that the Director considers it necessary, in order  to 
enable a person wishing to enter a particular market for the provision of 
telecommunications services to do so, or to enable a person engaged in such a market 
to establish or maintain a presence’.  Finally, in 1996 the company agreed to the 
removal of A DCs in exchange for the removal of the constraint of RPI + 2% on 
rentals.  The access deficit, however, have not entirely disappeared.  In 1998 the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigated the charges that BT made to its 
customers for calls to mobiles which until that point had been unregulated.  The 
Commission agreed with the regulator that the calls to mobile should be price capped 
but allowed the company to include a charge to reflect the access deficit. 
 
The imposition of an ADC reflects the application of relatively conventional ECPR 
opportunity cost approaches to access pricing.  However, the choice and ability to 
waive them for entrants until they had sufficient market power emphasises again the 
distinction between the objectives of competition law and sector specific regulation.  
 
4.2 Network Access 
 
BT’s Licence requires that BT provide interconnection between the BT network and 
any other licensed operator.  Initially interconnection charges were left for the 
companies to agree.  For example, BT would negotiate with Mercury to set the price 
that BT would charge to deliver Mercury calls to BT customers and the price that 
Mercury would charge BT to deliver BT calls to Mercury customers.  If parties could   20
not agree then the regulator determines the price.  In the early 1990s Oftel embarked 
on a programme of moving away from negotiated and determined access charges to 
standard charges.  This started through the Interconnection and Accounting Separation 
proposals and ended with the detailed Network Charge Control pricing structure.  A 
driver behind this process was that ‘arrangements should not be unduly discriminatory 
either between competing operators or between BT and other operators’.
25  There is a 
network price cap that fixes BT’s charges to other licensed operators and to BT Retail.  
BT Retail is required to demonstrate that its retail tariffs cover costs after taking 
account of transfer charges from BT Network.  
 
At the core of the network charge regime is the concept of long run incremental cost.  
This is a detailed procedure that breaks down the cost structure of the network and is 
the base for all access pricing to BT’s network.  An unusual and little recognised 
feature of LRIC is that it does not follow the standard economist’s concept of the 
incremental cost of a service and is not always consistent with the type of incremental 
cost that lies at the heart of competition law.  This has strong implications for access 
pricing that is not always recognised.  
 
Telecommunication services comprise of  many inputs or components, e.g., an 
outgoing international call typically includes a call origination local exchange 
segment, a local to tandem transmission segment, an inter-tandem IDD conveyance 
segment and an outgoing IDD conveyance segment.  Consider a simplified view of a 
telecommunications system where there are three services.  Each service uses two 
network (upstream) components, 1 and 2, and a retail (downstream) element.  Now 
consider the incremental cost of adding service C to a telecommunication company 
that is already supplying Services A and B. The common costs do not enter the 
incremental cost since the service is viewed as an increment to the other services.  
This is the basic notion of the incremental cost of a service that, for example, is 
relevant for the definition of predatory pricing in the EC access notice. 
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The LRIC used in the UK telecommunications sector, which for clarity will be called 
Oftel LRIC, differs from the notion of increment described above.
26  It does not look 
at the incremental cost of each service in the way that was outlined above.  There is a 
good reason why it does not – namely that it was introduced to meet other needs, that 
of ensuring that regulated access prices does not favour BT’s downstream operations 
and to promote competition.  We return to this point later.   
 
Instead of looking at the incremental cost of final services, the Oftel LRIC looks at the 
notion of increment in terms of adding components to other components.  It starts 
with a distinction between Access and Network and looks at the cost of adding a 
Network to the Access Business.  Within the Network Business it then considers the 
increment of components to a company with other components and brings these 
together to determine restrictions such as price floors for services. When component 1 
is viewed as an increment to component 2, the costs that are common across services 
and lie in component 1 now enter the incremental cost. Once these increments are 
aggregated to determine the LRIC part of the common costs enter the incremental cost 
the service.   It is clear that this provides a completely different incremental cost to the 
incremental cost of a service. The choice of increment as a component taking the 
other components as given, instead of the conventional increment as a product or 
service taking other services as given, is the main difference between Oftel’s Network 
LRIC and the conventional economic incremental cost.   
 
The practical difference between an economic notion of incremental cost and the 
Oftel approach can be seen, for example, if we consider outgoing international calls. 
These consist of a call origination local exchange segment, a local to tandem 
transmission segment, an inter-tandem IDD conveyance segment and an outgoing 
IDD conveyance segment.  Oftel's Network LRIC takes the call origination local 
exchange segment as an increment to a company, which has all the other components 
in place.  This gives an incremental cost floor for the call origination local exchange 
segment.  This is used t o set a lower bound on the price for this component.  This 
charge goes straight into the price floor for the price of an international call.  
                                                   
26Full details of the Network LRIC are contained in BT's Accounting Documents  (13 November 1998) 
and full details of the Retail LRIC are available the BT's Methodology for the Derivation of Long Run 
Incremental Costs for BT's Retail Business and the associated guidance notes (December 1998).    22
Following a similar process for all other components and applying the combinatorial 
tests provides a cost floor for international outgoing calls.   
 
In contrast, a standard service based economic notion of incremental cost would look 
at the addition to the cost when outgoing international calls are added to the other 
services offered by the company.  The standard economic incremental cost would 
look at the increase in cost of the call origination local exchange segment caused by 
the extra demand that arises because the company now offers international outgoing 
calls.  The call origination local exchange segment would already be in place because 
the company is offering other services, such as national and local calls, and it is only 
the extra cost caused by international outgoing calls that is relevant.  Note that this 
figure is likely to be far lower than the Oftel LRIC figure for the call origination local 
exchange segment.  Following a similar process through each component and 
aggregating gives the ‘incremental cost’ of the service.
27   
 
This detailed LRIC model forms the basis of BT’s network charges to other operators 
and the transfer charges within BT (the Network Charge Control).  The central point 
about the Oftel LRIC model is that it is designed to meet particular regulatory 
requirements.  Essentially, the regulatory framework based on LRIC operates far 
more closely to a price squeeze test than may appear at first glance.  An ECPR 
approach to access pricing will deliver very different prices depending on the notion 
of incremental cost is based on Figure 2 or Figure 4.  The LRIC of a service is 
necessary if a precise ECPR is to be implemented.  Using an Oftel LRIC will produce 
far lower access prices and far higher predatory price floors than will arise with a 
conventional notion of the incremental cost of a service.  Which is the appropriate 
incremental notion depends on the job at hand. We return to this issue in section 5.  
Finally, before turning to the implications for the pricing of common carriage in water 
the provision of network services water requires consideration.  The Network Charge 
control applies to licensed telecommunications operators.  However, there are many 
                                                   
27 There are additional differences that arise because there are many components within the network.  
To simplify the application of Oftel’s LRIC the common cost of a large part of the network, called the 
Core, are treated as if they are not common.  The common costs of the components in the core are split 
up and added to the actual incremental costs of each component in the core, i.e., these common costs 
are treated as if they were part of the incremental cost of a component and not common.  
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resellers and users of telecommunications that are not operators.  These are referred to 
as service providers.  Service providers include companies providing or reselling 
basic telephony switched services and companies providing information or content 
delivered entirely by means of telecommunications.  These users do not pay LRIC 
prices and BT is able to set prices to independent service providers for network 
services that are below prices charged to end users to take due account of the net cost 
savings in providing services to independent service providers (see Oftel (1997)).  
Examples of cost savings are billing, finance, marketing and sales, customer service, 
and operator services depending on what the service provider requires. Oftel do not 
consider such pricing to be undue discrimination within the terms of the licence.  
However, Oftel insist that independent service providers should not normally be 
obliged to pay for services or elements of a service that they do not use.  The service 




5.  Implications for Common Carriage of Water 
 
As indicated in the introduction the water sector regulator in the UK, Ofwat, has 
stated that it will deal with common carriage using its powers under the 1998 
Competition Act and that when it comes to pricing of common carriage it is 
sympathetic to Economic Component Pricing Rule’.  Against this background we first 
assess this standpoint against the history of sector specific regulation in the UK and 
then look at the problems that will arise in using competition law to regulate access 
prices. 
 
5.1 Sector specific legislation 
One message that arises from the experience of access pricing in the UK is that ECPR 
type rules have been acceptable to telecommunications regulators in particular 
situations and in this sense there is consistency between Ofwat’s proposals and 
Oftel’s experience.  The initial ADC regime and the service provision regime are   24
example.  Globally, the Clear case in New Zealand is probably the most well known 
example.
28   
 
In contrast, the developments of the network charge control, which is used to charge 
other operators for BT’s network, has not moved in this direction.  The LRIC 
methodology that has been developed by Oftel is not, in its current form, consistent 
with ECPR and does not provide the evidence that is required by Ofwat.  To establish 
an ECPR price it is the long run incremental cost of a service that is required.  To 
determine the price it is the avoidable cost as defined using a service as the increment 
that is required.  Using Oftel LRIC costs as the measure of unavoidable costs will 
provide lower input prices than those dictated by ECPR.  However, in 
telecommunications the LRIC model is not used this way.  Loosely, charges in BT’s 
Network Charge Control are based on two components.  The first part of the charge 
for an upstream component represents the LRIC for that element.  Over and above 
this LRIC charge there may be an addition.  These additions, in total, are allowed to 
cover the costs that are common across the components.  That is the costs that are 
common across upstream components are allocated across the components and enter 
the price for that component for all uses.  Using the LRIC model in this way provides 
prices that are below ECPR access prices.   
 
Therefore, whether the LRIC model is used as it is in telecommunications or is used 
to define avoidable costs, the consequent prices are below ECPR. The reason that the 
LRIC model fails to match ECPR prices is that the Network Charge Control is a 
strong type of price squeeze.  In particular, there is no scope for discrimination 
between end uses.  This is deliberate in that it was introduced to deal with a special 
situation, namely to ensure that the incumbent is not discriminating in favour of its 
own downstream operation and to promote competition rather than simply protecting 
it.  However, if a price squeeze approach is to be adopted then this can be 
implemented directly without reference to many of the upstream costs since it is the 
upstream prices charged to others that are relevant for the test not the underlying 
costs.  Therefore, there is no obvious attraction for the Oftel LRIC model in the  
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Communications Ltd.’ NZLR 385 (1995).   25
common carriage context for the water sector.  
 
There is also a potential pitfall in embarking too far down the route of prescriptive, 
detailed cost modelling.  The UK telecommunications evidence suggests that there is 
a genuine danger that the processes can fail to adjust to the changing circumstances.  
Because of the particular structure of the LRIC machinery it is not relevant to all 
competition act issues and should be limited to those where it is.  However, what has 
happened in the introduction of the 1998 Competition Act is that the LRIC notion of 
increment and the more traditional notion of the increment of a service have been 
intertwined.  Indeed, it LRIC may have very limited use in the context of the 
competition act since the price squeeze is now explicit within the guidelines of the 
1998 Competition Act and EC notices.  The position is confused, however, by the 
semi-separated structure that is common in telecommunications. Where sectors of a 
business are neither fully vertically integrated nor fully separate there remains some 
uncertainty whether it is appropriate to use upstream prices or service incremental 
costs for conventional law tests such as an Akzo-type predation test.    
 
In summary, the Network Charge Control in telecommunications is a regime that fits 
with an objective of promoting rather than simply protecting competition.  In an 
industry where there it was anticipated that there would be an enormous degree of 
competition then one can see how a regulator with duties that include promoting the 
interests of consumers in respect of prices, quality and variety of telecommunications 
services and to promote effective competition would be attracted to a LRIC model 
that positively enhances competitors.  In contrast, the feasibility of common carriage 
of water as a real force in the market is far from clear.  It may be beneficial in some 
areas but it is difficult to be confident that it will take a major presence in the 
industry.  Therefore, it is particularly important not to adopt pricing strategies that 
deliberately promote entry since it may not be viable in the long term and so there is 
good reason not to follow the telecommunications example.  
 
5.2 Competition Law 
Section 2 of the paper has emphasised the differences between the objectives and 
basic structure  of UK competition law and sector specific regulation.  The evidence 
given in Section 2 related to the 1973 Fair Trading Act not the 1998 Competition Act   26
and to date insufficient practical experience to know how regulators will apply 
competition law to access issues. If, however, in the application of the Competition 
Act, the regulators adhere to the objectives of competition law as opposed to the 
duties of sector specific regulation and continue to reflect the historic empirical 
differences between competition law and the regulatory model, then one will expect 
outcomes to be different if common carriage is treated under the Competition Act 
rather than under sector specific regulation such as Oftel’s Network Charge Control. 
Even if, as expected, the 1998 Competition Act represents a tightening of competition 
law in the UK, the evidence of the 1973 Fair Trading Act suggests that competition 
law is likely to provide significant flexibility relative to sector specific regulation. 
This may not in itself be harmful to efficiency but may limit the scope for common 
carriage to those areas where it is clearly beneficial.  
 
Turning first to excessive pricing, the UK Competition Act guidelines on excessive 
pricing appear to leave significant flexibility.  In particular, they offer little evidence 
of how to deal with the problem of common cost.  The guidelines seem to imply that 
the existing approach to abusive excessive pricing is perfectly consistent with access 
pricing rules based on the ECPR.  However, it is not clear that they automatically lead 
in this direction.  Time will tell whether a regulatory agency that favours ECPR will 
find that companies have too much scope within the Competition Act.  It could be 
that the excessive pricing rules allow firms to set prices that exceed, albeit not by too 
much, ECPR based prices.  
 
It is the growing interest and application of the price squeeze in competition law, 
however, that appears to have more direct application to the determination of access 
pricing policy.  If Ofwat import this from the UK telecommunications guidelines and 
EC notices, and apply the concept with a tight interpretation of discrimination, then 
this could impose quite tight restrictions on acceptable access pricing regimes.  In 
particular there would be a strong contradiction with static economic based pricing 
rules such as the ECPR although this depends on the specific cost structure and will 
need teasing out on a case by case basis. On the other hand, there is a pure practical 
attraction in using such an approach since it side steps many of the problems of 
modelling transmission costs since much of the test is based on comparison of prices 
not costs.     27
 
The central point here is how much discrimination is allowed interpreted in the 
presence of significant fixed and common costs; initially by Ofwat in their application 
of the Competition Act but ultimately by the Competition Commission in its role as 
appeal court.  If charges for up stream carriage are allowed to reflect the different 
markets that the water is supplied to then the price squeeze will provide less conflict 
with ECPR.  However, if all common carriage must be charged at the same price for 
all users in a price squeeze test then there will be a conflict.  
 
The problem with the price squeeze is that, a s currently defined by the EC and the 
UK, it can conflict with efficient pricing and it is far from clear how it will be 
interpreted.  The difficulty arises to a large extent because there is almost no case law.  
Until there are a series of appeals the precise nature of a price squeeze remains 
uncertain.  The problem may be less extreme in the context of water because there is 
neither the diversity of product or technology that exists in telecommunications.  
However, as has been shown in Section 3 the conflict with economic pricing rules can 
still arise.  One assumes that the companies will start with prices that pass price 
squeeze tests under an appropriate definition of discrimination but will fail under 
others.  If Ofwat find this position acceptable, and there are good economic reasons 
why they should find some degree of discrimination acceptable in this context, then 
this will go some way to clarifying the picture on price squeeze but this will remain 
untested until a few cases in telecommunications and water go to appeal.  
 
This implies that competition law as currently defined given EC case law leaves some 
uncertainty both for the providers of common carriage and the potential entrants.  It is 
very likely that the price squeeze will take an important position in the assessment of 
appropriate prices for common carriage therefore current competition law in 
telecommunications will have significant impact on the interpretation of pricing for 
common carriage in water.   
 
Finally, this comparison of competition law in telecommunications and water may 
throw some light on how to implement competition law.  The view that ECPR is fully 
consistent with the Competition Act in the water sector will not mesh in directly with 
the competition law approaches that have recently been applied to   28
telecommunications sector by the EC or Oftel.  But this is a single act that has to be 
applied in a consistent manner to all by the courts.  So there is a conflict. The problem 
arises from the way that the 1998 Competition Act is implemented in the UK.  Each 
sector specific regulator applies the Competition Act to companies within their sector 
and the OFT apply the Act elsewhere in the economy.  This is referred to as 
concurrent application of the Competition Act.  Disparity of regulatory approach has 
always been a potential problem and has led some to argue that the concurrent 
approach is flawed.  This conflict between application of the Act in the 
telecommunications and water sectors give strength to the view that concurrent 
application is defective.     29
Appendix 
 
Ramsey prices relate the final price to marginal costs and elasticities.  In general, if 
there are fixed and common costs these prices will be a ‘mark-up’ on marginal cost to 
provide revenues to cover the fixed and common cost.  If we denote c as the marginal 
cost of transporting water, ci as the marginal cost of water for the incumbent network 
owner and ce as the marginal cost of water for the entrant then the optimal final prices 
will satisfy 
 
(1)  pi – c – ci     =      m 
     pi                      ei    
 
 
(2)    pe – c – ce     =      m 
     pc                      ee  
 
 
where pi (p e) and ei (ee) are the final price and elasticity of the incumbent (entrant).  m 
is a positive constant that is determined by how much money is to be raised. If entry is 
competitive (i.e. , the entrant makes no abnormal profit) then the access price is 
determined by equations (1) and (2) and  
 




(4)  pa   =    pe  -  ce.  
 
Substituting (4) into (2) gives: 
 
(5)  pa – c      m 












Therefore, pa is greater than the marginal cost as long as there is a fixed or common 
cost to recover ( i.e. m > 0 )  and ee is finite.  (6) shows that in general setting the 
access price equal to marginal cost underestimates the optimal access charge. 
 
An important special case arises when the entrant’s and incumbent’s products have 
identical elasticity (i.e. ei = ee). (6) and (1) gives:  
 
(7)  pa – c                pi – c – ci 
   pc                               pI 
 
Providing the incumbent is not able to manipulate the market (e.g., if it is regulated) 
then equal elasticities will imply pi = pc which reduces (7) to 
 




pa   =   pi  –  c 
 
 
That is, the access price is set equal to the incumbent’s final price minus the cost that 
the incumbent saves because the entrant provides supply.  Note that this does not 
assume that the demand is incremental to existing demand.  The underlying 
assumption is that the entrant’s customers should contribute to the fixed and common 
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